Few people remember today a political scenario about a “government of the defeated” on the eve of the 2023 elections. It was hinted at by the then-leader of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, who nevertheless walked it back in April of that same year. This did not stop other senior figures of the then-official opposition — among them Euclid Tsakalotos and Yannis Dragasakis — from leaving such a possibility open, especially given that the elections would be held under proportional representation. Ultimately, this theory was discredited well before New Democracy’s double electoral victory and outright majority. Yet around the same time, in the aftermath of the Tempi tragedy, scenarios of a “special purpose government” — one focused on establishing accountability for the disaster and addressing interference with the rule of law — began to gain traction once more. These too were abandoned, however, following the voters’ verdict and ND’s second consecutive majority.
The role of a special purpose government
Today, in an entirely different political landscape, similar approaches have suddenly begun to circulate once again, with the dominant one being the formation of a “special purpose government” — should the ballot box fail to produce a party with an outright majority or allow for programmatic convergence between parties. But how would such a government actually take shape, and what would it aim to achieve? On these questions, the various scenarios diverge — not only on who the potential participants in such a hypothetical arrangement might be, but also on precisely what it would set out to accomplish.
There is, first of all, an extreme version of this scenario, tied to a decisive defeat of Kyriakos Mitsotakis in the upcoming elections. Those who support it believe that the Prime Minister, if defeated — and assuming that a leadership contest within New Democracy would follow — should be made to answer for his actions in court. This would essentially be a variation of the special purpose government formed in 1989, which led to the referral of Andreas Papandreou to the Special Court — where he was ultimately acquitted. Although the specific “charges” remain unclear, such a scenario could potentially attract a diverse and heterogeneous coalition of political forces united around a single objective: the criminalization of political life. Such extreme theories are firmly rejected by both New Democracy and PASOK — a party that experienced firsthand the ordeal of seeing its leader referred to a Special Court, and which in 2023 also pushed back against Tsipras’s insinuations about a special government, viewing such scenarios as a gift to New Democracy.
A question of instability
It is clear that even the term “special purpose government” evokes other eras and circumstances. The key question is whether there is genuine political or economic instability that would drive such an arrangement. Calls for accountability do surface regularly in public discourse, of course. Just last Wednesday, Maria Karystianou, commenting on the Prime Minister’s attendance at the NATO Summit in Turkey, spoke of “national treason” and stated that “Mr. Mitsotakis will be held accountable for this too.”
There are, however, softer versions of the “special purpose government” concept also being put forward. Yannis Magkriotis, writing in To Vima (2/7/26), suggests that “we will have ‘special purpose’ governments, with at least three parties. New Democracy, ELAS, and PASOK–Movement for Change is one possible configuration.” He does not clarify whether New Democracy would be included in his proposed scheme with or without Kyriakos Mitsotakis. It is nonetheless worth examining what this government would actually do — something that, in his framing, has nothing to do with accountability or referrals to a Special Court. “The first ‘special purpose’ government will be formed for the EU Presidency and ongoing administration,” writes Magkriotis, adding: “At least for the progressive parties, there is an obligation that can also serve as a powerful additional argument for their participation in the ‘special purpose’ government. The parties of the progressive opposition, whether or not they participate in the government, form a majority for changing the electoral law… Only through a system of simple proportional representation can a political environment and majority emerge in the next elections — whether first or second, depending on when the new electoral law comes into force — for the formation of a credible progressive government.”
Politically dominant
Since there is clearly considerable confusion about what a special purpose government actually means, let us attempt to map out where this proposal originates. One “source” comes from parts of the opposition and center-left analysts who believe that the erosion of the current government creates the conditions for post-election cooperation among opposition parties. Another strand is made up of certain parties, political figures, and media outlets that are particularly critical of the government — linking the scenario to cases such as Tempi, the wiretapping scandal, or the OPEKEPE affair, and presenting a special purpose government as a vehicle for political “cleansing.”
It is abundantly clear from current polling that while the government is losing ground, it remains politically dominant; the opposition is fragmented with deep internal rivalries; and the prospect of an outright majority is growing ever more remote. It is precisely at such moments that the conversation shifts from “who will win” to “who can form a majority.” That is exactly what we are witnessing today. This is not yet an official plan of any unified political bloc — it is primarily a scenario being deployed by various political and media players to shape the post-election conversation, against a backdrop of political fluidity.
Originally published in the newspaper “Karfi”.
