The age distribution of the vote is one of the most fascinating and revealing aspects of electoral behavior, shedding light on either the cohesion or the dividing lines that exist within society as a whole. New Democracy’s high vote share in the last national election of June 2023 was largely driven by broad cross-demographic support it received from virtually all population groups, allowing it to finish first in every age category — including younger voters, who are not traditionally part of its core base. Specifically, according to exit poll data, New Democracy secured 28.8% of voters aged 17 to 24, approximately 10 percentage points ahead of SYRIZA, which came in second with 19.2% — a demographic that had overwhelmingly and enthusiastically backed the party of the renewal Left in the double electoral contest of 2015.
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New Democracy’s electoral influence among youth and its stronghold with older age groups
The disappointment and unmet expectations left behind by SYRIZA’s time in government significantly weakened its influence among younger voters, who have traditionally been a privileged constituency for left-wing parties in Greece. However, New Democracy’s first-place finish among voters under 34 did not fundamentally alter its age-based electoral composition, as the bulk of its support continued to come from older age groups — peaking among the over-65s, where the party captured an extraordinary 51.7%. This highlights the issue of age-based electoral inequality in Greece and the transient nature of the younger vote, as demonstrated in the 2024 European elections, when New Democracy slipped to second place behind SYRIZA among voters aged 17 to 34. In that contest, the governing party polled around 16% in that age bracket — well below its national average of 28.3%, which it achieved once again largely on the strength of the over-65 vote, where it managed to hold onto roughly 40% support.
A battle already lost
Two and a half years on from the European elections, current polling data continues to reflect, to a significant degree, this generational gap for the governing party — which registers low penetration among younger age groups while holding firm among older ones. An additional challenge for New Democracy has now emerged in the middle-aged cohort of 40 to 55-year-olds — the so-called working-age group, where its polling figures hover just above 20%, in an age bracket we commonly associate with the middle class. This is, however, a problem that affects the entire party system, as no existing political formation appears to be attracting the strong preference of this group, which has the highest proportion of undecided voters — exceeding 20%.
This disparity is not confined to voting intention surveys alone, but is reflected across a range of other political indicators. Their combined analysis reinforces the generational divide that splits the electorate — and, taken together with the demographic composition of the population, sustains New Democracy’s dominance. By securing the support of age groups that tend to display more stable and consistent electoral behavior, the party starts from a position of advantage with a comfortable buffer over its rivals.
A divided electorate
But what is actually driving this split in the electorate? Is it the traditional pull that left-leaning parties exert on young people in every country and every era? How much truth can such a historical reading hold in the age of Trump and the resurgence of right-wing nationalism across the old continent? Kyriakos Mitsotakis can hardly be considered the archetypal leader of a conservative party — yet in the eyes of a large segment of young people, New Democracy continues to be perceived as the political force most closely identified with a system that perpetuates inequality, job insecurity, low wages, and social uncertainty.
Unlike in previous decades, today’s youth are largely materialistic, driven by a desire for access to the consumer goods of the capitalist economy. They are not motivated by post-materialist ideals — instead, they seek immediate and rapid acquisition of goods and services, in line with contemporary consumption patterns. As long as today’s government — and any future government — fails to deliver that access, younger generations will continue to gravitate toward anti-establishment politics.
*Originally published in Parapolitika
