2025 ended without major surface changes regarding the Ukrainian conflict. The talks involving stakeholders in Miami did not lead to any tangible results, although some surprise cannot be ruled out, as yesterday Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated he would meet directly with Trump, noting that “much can be decided before New Year’s.”
Based on announcements, international press reports, and yesterday’s statements by Putin to Russian businessmen, nothing particularly changes regarding Moscow’s demands related to the issues it has put on the table from the beginning (territorial, non-membership of Ukraine in NATO, etc.), believing that, sooner or later, it will achieve its strategic objectives. This seems to be accepted by the US as well, with J.D. Vance noting after Miami in his UnHerd interview that Ukraine will ultimately “lose Donetsk,” something that “Ukrainians privately acknowledge,” although it may still require time (12 months, perhaps more, according to the American Vice President, who identifies the territorial issue as the biggest “thorn” in negotiations). Ukraine, for its part, appears to be trying to avoid the most repugnant possible end to the war, having received a “breather” of 90 billion euros from the EU’s “24” loan and creating “threat performances” for strikes on Russia where they are less (or not at all) expected, such as strikes on tankers in the Mediterranean or oil platforms in the Caspian, or the assassination of Russian Brigadier General Fanil Sarvarov in Moscow, following a car explosion, with this particular officer (head of Training Directorate in the Russian General Staff) being the third officer to lose his life in a similar manner in Moscow this year.
Ukrainian conflict: Question of Russia’s economic endurance
Russia believes time is obviously running in its favor, although there are certain issues that should not escape attention: First of all, there is a question of its economy’s endurance. Hydrocarbon export revenues are showing significant decline, with Reuters reporting a decrease of up to 49% in December compared to a year ago, against the backdrop of imposed sanctions and the “plunge” in oil prices. Budget pressure is evident, as defense spending has skyrocketed, reaching 149 billion in the first three quarters of this year, according to a Washington Post analysis (over 7% of GDP).
Simultaneously, there is the inflation issue, which, in order to be addressed, led to a dramatic interest rate increase by the Russian central bank, reaching up to 20% (now it’s 16%, as the American outlet notes). In fact, the impacts are expected to exist post-war as well: Bloomberg specifically reported that because Russia turned massively to borrowing, the war’s footprint will be there for years to come (even if the conflict ended tomorrow), as interest must be repaid with money from the budget that is already “locked.” And one could argue that perhaps patience would pay off, provided the benefits are tangible on the battlefields.
On this, however, there is doubt: for some time Ukraine has maintained that there is disinformation from the Kremlin on this issue, with the Financial Times reporting in their publication this week that Russian generals convince the president that Russia will soon win the war, which explains his insistence on rejecting the favorable terms proposed by the American side and refusing to sign any peace agreement. According to the F.T., Russian military services and security services systematically provide possibly false information to Putin. They exaggerate Ukraine’s losses, magnify Russia’s military advantages, and downplay tactical failures. This may create a sense of superiority, which was projected in the traditional press conference for the year’s assessment given by the Russian president last week, where he said “the enemy is retreating in all directions.”
Ukraine’s difficult position
In any case, of course, the one in a difficult position is Ukraine, which has turned its attention to providing security guarantees, with United States participation, reminiscent of NATO’s Article 5. Washington is the “key,” as even a potential “Coalition of the Willing,” with dominant European presence, would have to rely on American stewardship, as Politico reminds us, which also (quite aptly) states that the issue ultimately lies “in Putin’s hands.” Beyond the per se interpretation of the clause existing in NATO’s charter, something Trump himself has mentioned, ultimately the Russian view can hardly not be taken into account. And if it’s about Washington during the Trump period, which has already set the agenda for cooperation with Moscow (against the backdrop of parallel isolation of Beijing on the geopolitical chessboard), the issue arises with even greater emphasis. Ukraine, moreover, already appears to have left “behind” the idea of NATO membership, while Zaluzhny’s warnings about civil war give a particular tone.
Published in Parapolitika
