After a long period of absence of initiatives by Greek diplomacy in the Southern Mediterranean zone, where disputes remain regarding the demarcation of jurisdiction and economic exploitation zones between Greece and Libya, and where Turkey attempts to create fait accompli contrary to prevailing International Law through the invalid Turkey-Libya memorandum from 2019, Athens is returning to the geopolitical region seeking solutions and exits to the entanglements that have been created in the meantime.
Greece’s comeback in the Southern Mediterranean – From inaction to counterattack
From August 2020, when the partial delimitation agreement of the EEZs between Egypt and Greece was signed by the then Foreign Ministers Dendias and Shoukry, until May 2025, when the strategic Greece-Egypt agreement was signed, Greek diplomacy avoided any significant moves in the region south and southwest of Crete. Possibly due to the fact that Libya does not have a stable, institutional governance and representation system after Gaddafi’s fall for signing official agreements, even when the hot civil war between Benghazi and Tripoli ceased, but also due to Athens’ change of priorities in its regional international policy from 2023, counting on a more reliable relationship and coordination with Turkey after the famous Athens Declaration and the intensification of bilateral dialogue, even at leadership level, with Ankara and the Erdogan administration.
Athens dangerously left room for activity and formation of alignments against its structural and legitimate interests in the disputed region
How Turkey gained ground in Libya
Essentially, Greece dangerously left room for activity and formation of alignments against its structural and legitimate interests in the disputed region. This became spectacularly apparent from the meeting in Constantinople of the leadership of Turkey, Italy, Libya (Erdogan, Meloni, Dbeibah) for the exploitation of Libya’s oil and its support, with Greece’s loud exclusion from it, despite Gerapetritis’ efforts with discussions in Tripoli and Benghazi for our country to assume a role, also leveraging the European card.
From Turkey’s side, this gap was exploited in previous years with discreet and not pompous diplomacy, in order to gradually upgrade its relations with General Haftar, leader of Cyrenaica and former opponent of Turkish influence in the Tripoli regime, in order to achieve support for the unreasonable memorandum with Libya, both in terms of International Law of the Sea and geographically. The result of this development was that on May 27 and June 20, there were verbal communications from Libya’s side, fully aligned with Ankara’s views, which challenged the delimitation of the median line between maritime spaces with Greece, as well as the delimitation of auctioned plots for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction that have been announced by Greece since 2014 and 2017, without reactions from Libya. In these communications, Tripoli fully adopts Ankara’s perspective and promotes the logic that islands, including Crete, do not have economic exploitation zones beyond their territorial waters, resulting in Athens’ definition of the “median line” overlapping part of Libya’s territory.
In this disturbance, Turkey plays a leading role, as it tries to attack the peaceful negotiation between the two countries and any possible joint recourse to international arbitration
The verbal communications and Greece’s response
Just on Wednesday, Athens responded with its verbal communication, with full formality and publicity, to the UN Secretary General with very solid arguments, based on the 1982 International Law of the Sea, regarding the limits of economic exploitation zones it is entitled to, and the validity of the “median line” with Libya. Beyond these, it reminds that Libya in all previous years since 2014 and 2017, when the announcement of plots for exploitation by Greece occurred, had submitted no objection whatsoever.
At the same time, Athens, wanting to take a step further, indicative of its will to permanently delimit the zones with Libya, announced a technical and political committee for bilateral negotiations between the two countries, in order to resolve the pending issue regarding the extent of their maritime zones. It should be noted that also from Libya’s side, the plots that have been announced for energy exploitation respect the “median line” that Athens has defined.
Naturally, in this disturbance, Turkey plays a leading role, as it tries to attack the peaceful negotiation between the two countries and any possible joint recourse to international arbitration for determining their EEZs, in order to keep its memorandum with Libya active, even if it cannot produce legal results nor relate to adjacent or neighboring countries. The entire energy that has been channeled into the diplomatic chessboard of the Southern Mediterranean, especially in the triangle of Greece-Libya-Egypt, relates to the interest of two emblematic American oil giants to undertake activity in the region in question, under conditions of legality and stability.
Chevron is the main international player for exploration and extraction in the plots that Greece has announced for tender west and southwest of Crete, beyond the plots where Exxon Mobil is already involved, while the latter, as announced in the last 24 hours, is already undertaking the exploration and extraction of Libya’s oil deposits or those of natural gas, with a signed agreement with Tripoli. This development is considered decisive for Libya’s economy, as production of at least 2 million barrels daily is a main criterion for its survival.
The backstory with Egypt
If in Libya’s case there are some data that partially justify the substantial withdrawal of Greek diplomacy from the region, in no way can Greek clumsiness in relations with Egypt be explained. In this case, the two countries throughout the previous decade develop increasingly close and multi-level relations in diplomatic triangles with Cyprus and Israel. The delimitation of maritime zones between them has already been agreed since 2020, as happened with Italy, while an electrical cable that will connect Egypt with Europe through Greece, specifically Crete, is a project in progress. Simultaneously, within the current year, a strategic bilateral agreement was ceremoniously concluded by Athens, with President Sisi’s presence here. Greece appears to have supported the provision of economic support to Egypt in Europe, while at the statement level, there were no bitter comments at any level.
Despite all this, disruptions emerged in recent months, which in some Athens circles gave the opportunity to express their suspicion regarding the reliability and stability of the Athens-Cairo axis and the convergences in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East, projecting their known obsessions that all roads pass through the Sublime Porte in Turkey. Whatever issues were created recently in the relationship with Egypt have now become very specific. The visit of Foreign Minister M. Abdelati in August to Athens and the discussions with his Greek counterpart, in a very positive climate as it appears, both highlighted and provided exits to these issues. The main issue was the property matter of the Greek Orthodox Sinai Monastery, where the Ismailia Court of Appeals decision on the ownership regime created very serious upheaval.
Greece has appealed regarding the annulment of this specific verdict to Egypt’s Supreme Court, whose decision is expected in two years, while it legislated a Presidential Decree for the monastery’s property and ownership. The discussions and declarations that followed by the two Foreign Ministers in Athens give optimism that very soon, as Mr. Abdelati emphasized, there will be an agreement for the monastery from the Egyptian state, with Greece’s presence. Regarding the monastery’s worship character, the Egyptian minister was categorical that any information or rumors about its conversion to a museum are “nonexistent and malicious.” One of the issues that had remained in the obscurity of publicity from the Greek Foreign Ministry were the objections that existed from Cairo for some specific areas where Greece and Egypt’s EEZs intersect as depicted in Greece’s maritime spatial planning. These different assessments are expected to be settled in a friendly climate. Beyond these, the conversations that developed for curbing illegal migration both on Egypt’s front and to a much greater degree from Libya’s territories are characterized as significant.
Egypt is the most neighboring country to Libya, while its borders with Cyrenaica (Eastern Libya) are absolutely open in the desert environment. In the web of these issues, there were approaches for increasing legal migration from Egypt, in order to cover the needs that arise in Greece in various sectors, such as tourism or primary production and naturally fishing. An issue that also Athens in previous years did not care for with due attention, despite its proclamations, causing bitterness in Cairo.
Published in Parapolitika
