Kyriakos Mitsotakis has brought into public discourse his proposal for making the position of minister incompatible with that of MP, as well as the possibility of reducing the number of MPs, with changes scheduled after the 2027 elections and linked to the need for constitutional revision. The proposal stipulates that an elected MP who assumes a position in the ministerial council would temporarily resign from their parliamentary status and be replaced by the first runner-up from their electoral district. If they leave the government, they would automatically return to Parliament, with the runner-up resigning accordingly.
This regulation, as stated, aims to separate executive from legislative power, while “upgrading the role of the MP,” as emphasized by the Prime Minister. To implement this change, constitutional intervention is required, which postpones its implementation to a later time. Kyriakos Mitsotakis referred the entire discussion to after the 2027 elections, as the constitutional revision process has not yet begun. If the proposal, which is formulated with reference to models from other countries like the French one, is included in the relevant dialogue and approved, it will take effect from the subsequent elections.
Pavlos Marinakis: The discussion on the number of MPs
Government spokesperson Pavlos Marinakis provided clarifications on the proposal, noting that it involves a change that will be subject to pre-election discussion but will be implemented after the elections.
As he mentioned, the proposal concerns the “suspension of parliamentary status” for any MP selected as a minister, with their replacement by a runner-up and their return to Parliament in case of departure from government.
At the same time, he put on the table the possibility of reducing the number of MPs, noting that “perhaps we should also discuss reducing the number of MPs,” so that there won’t be an increase in parliamentary offices beyond 300.
Mr. Marinakis specifically stated, regarding the Prime Minister’s proposal for “incompatibility” between minister and MP positions:
“Let me clarify some things to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. We’re talking about a proposal that will start being discussed pre-election, but any change will be after the elections. So we’re talking about something that, if it takes effect, will take effect after the elections. The second thing I want to say is that although the Constitution provides for the passage of a law, existing legislation, this proposal for us should be included in the broader discussion for constitutional revision, so as you understand, the required enhanced majorities in one of the two parliamentary periods are needed, this one or the next. Now let’s say some things about the basis, the logic of this proposal.
“I read somewhere – correctly – we’re talking about the French model. Here we’re talking about suspension of parliamentary status for an MP who will be selected by each prime minister as a minister. For as long as the MP is a minister, they won’t be an MP and will be replaced by the corresponding runner-up in the same electoral district. As you understand, if there’s a reshuffle and they leave the position of minister or deputy minister, they will return to the MP position. Correspondingly, they can be a candidate again anyway. Here we hear criticism that ‘maybe this way we’ll actually have more parliamentary offices.’ Because there will be the 300 MPs who aren’t ministers or deputy ministers, plus some ministers and deputy ministers, MPs under suspension, who will have the ability and will want to be re-elected. That’s why I think we need to see the overall proposal, as it will be formulated by the Prime Minister to society, to the party, New Democracy, in view of the Congress. Because, for example, for this proposal to proceed, perhaps we should also discuss reducing the number of MPs so we don’t actually have 350 total offices instead of 300. I repeat, all these are under discussion. They’re not decisions.
“They’re thoughts that will be put to public dialogue, along with many other very important institutional interventions, following policies implemented to address the clientelist state. Because this discussion has to do with the role of the MP, strengthening the MP’s role. It’s not a move to address the clientelist state. Addressing the clientelist state happens with policies like faster pension allocation, overall digital state, electronic service of summons, OPEKEPE’s transition to AADE. No one can – and want to – from now on ask for something to change in AADE, as happened in the past. I don’t think there’s anyone who believes they can intervene to reduce someone’s property tax or pay income tax later.
“So correspondingly, now even if someone wants to do something that could be done all previous years at OPEKEPE, with OPEKEPE’s transition to AADE, it won’t be possible. Whether the phone call happens or not, AADE will do its job, as it does in all other obligations it has. This, for example, is addressing the clientelist state, like all the rest and many others the Prime Minister mentioned, but the opposition didn’t vote for this reform. So I repeat, we’re not talking about something that can happen tomorrow morning. We’re not talking about an executive law. We’re talking about something that will be included in the broader discussion, along with everything we’ve already said about constitutional revision. It’s under consultation, under formation, it has a series of related discussions that need to happen. So I recommend that whoever has positions, proposals – anyway the Parliamentary group sends proposals – we should look at all these at the right time, both pre-election, where we open the discussion, but mainly post-election.”
What is minister-MP incompatibility: The French model
Minister-MP incompatibility essentially doesn’t allow a person to be part of both executive and legislative power simultaneously.
Thus, a member of Parliament (legislative power) cannot simultaneously hold any public office (executive power), to ensure independence of judgment.
This is a separation that France applies, based on Article 23 of its Constitution, since 1958. The French model stipulates that the duties of a government member are incompatible with exercising any parliamentary mandate.
French ministers are required to abandon their parliamentary seat within one month of assuming their duties as ministers. Their position in Parliament is taken by substitute MPs.
In Greece’s Constitution, Article 26 referring to State Organization and Functions stipulates that:
– Legislative function is exercised by Parliament and the President of the Republic
– Executive function is exercised by the President of the Republic and the Government
– Judicial function is exercised by courts; their decisions are executed in the name of the Greek People
