Speaking to parapolitika.gr, Giannis Valinakis, former Deputy Foreign Minister of New Democracy under Kostas Karamanlis’ government (2004-2009), expresses strong criticism of the current foreign policy. Valinakis rejects the 5×5 multilateral Eastern Mediterranean conference announced by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, describing it as a “Turkish scheme” that “essentially aims both to impose the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, and to upgrade the occupied territories at the expense of the Republic of Cyprus.” For the first time, he responds to criticism leveled by Prime Minister Mitsotakis against the foreign policy of the Karamanlis era and proposes a “genuine national initiative” in the country’s foreign policy instead of a “multilateral balancing act.”
Professor, the international environment seems unstable and unpredictable. Wars and crises, mainly in energy, have changed international balances. Trump’s election has brought developments we probably didn’t expect. Are we living in a dystopian international environment?
Indeed, the international horizon is becoming increasingly grim. Fundamental rules of international politics and peaceful coexistence are threatened, primarily the principle of inviolability – the stability of international borders. Uncertainty is intensified by President Trump’s ambiguous stance toward European security and his apparent preference for state power over international law. All this, combined with his admiration for “strong leaders” like – according to his statements – Mr. Erdogan, is extremely worrying for Hellenism.
With our Turkish neighbors, we don’t seem to be finding common ground and solutions to problems. What do you say?
Finding common ground was inherently extremely difficult, given the outrageous Turkish claims, which we tend to forget extend to our very islands. The Athens Declaration obviously didn’t deliver, except for superficial calm in the Aegean airspace – and that due to known weaknesses of the Turkish air force. Meanwhile, the balance of power with Turkey deteriorates daily (militarily, diplomatically, demographically, etc.).
However, the Greek government has undertaken an initiative for a summit of coastal countries in our region, including Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Turkey and Libya. First, I’d like to ask if this initiative is heading in the right direction. What do you think?
Regarding the “Eastern Mediterranean Conference” initiative, this is actually an older proposal by Mr. Erdogan. It’s positive that we’re finally worried about potential mediating interventions by President Trump, but is it possible that the only plan we conceived as a country is the… Turkish one? I remind you that we accepted the idea in October 2020, under pressure from Oruc Reis in the Greek EEZ and the EU’s “equidistant mediation.” We correctly rejected it later when we realized where it was leading. Why then resurrect a Turkish-inspired scheme that essentially aims both to impose the “Blue Homeland” in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and to upgrade the occupied territories at the expense of the Republic of Cyprus?
Could such a proposal have results? Considering the American factor moving behind the scenes, where could things lead?
I wonder what’s the basis for optimism about implementing the proposal with gains for Hellenism – because that should be the goal. Do we foresee the collapse of the Athens Declaration and dialogue as we’ve experienced it since, and are we seeking an alternative forum? Do we really believe Turkey will join – according to leaks – talks based on international maritime law and accept Cyprus Republic participation without blackmailing for pseudo-state participation (especially now with Erciyes’ victory)? Who will represent Libya and what side effects will accepting both its governments cause? Have we secured preliminary support before announcing the proposal to “corner” Ankara? If we finally agree to expand the five-party format – with the pseudo-state and two Libyan delegations – as Turkey will likely demand, aren’t we indirectly accepting it has a say and rights based on the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, which we’ve categorically rejected until now, in areas where we claimed to have “neutralized” it through our own EEZ agreement with Egypt? Did we at least secure some serious quid pro quo? With what claims will we approach such a Conference and what specific gains does our “initiative” aim for?
What’s the alternative plan then? For example, what would you do regarding these serious issues today?
Instead of a multilateral balancing act that I fear will end up serving Ankara, we need a genuine national initiative more profitable for Hellenism. A plan that promotes our goals while being absolutely compatible with President Trump’s energy pursuits (“drill baby, drill”). I’ve published such a proposal since 2020: we leverage the EU framework and through “smart” parallel bilateral delimitation negotiations pressure each neighbor for the fastest closure of as many pending issues/areas as possible, so both sides of each agreement can soon exploit them energetically. For every year passing without exploitation, we shoulder enormous opportunity costs. Mr. Papastavrou understood this and is “running” the Libya issue. This way, we’ll control developments, leverage our comparative advantages and cause positive US support. We must move similarly pressingly regarding Albania and other neighbors.
Since you brought it up, I’d like to remind you that Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, last July, essentially responding to criticism of his foreign policy conduct, said among other things: “Remind me what significant initiative was undertaken in Greek-Turkish relations between 2004 and 2009, because I don’t remember any. As I recall, the then government tried to delimit maritime zones with Libya and didn’t succeed.” What happened then with Greek-Turkish relations?
I imagine he was briefed meanwhile by the then minister, Dora Bakoyannis, who was anything but inactive and promoted national interests with determination. That’s why I didn’t want to continue comparing the two periods, which indirectly emerges if one reads my latest book. The differences are, I think, obvious.
Can you be more specific?
First of all, under Kostas Karamanlis’ governments, supposedly “inactive” Greece developed multidimensional and productive relations, not only with the US, but also with Russia – through pipelines making Greece an energy hub – and China (Piraeus port). It also had the courage to prevent – despite fierce American pressure – then-FYROM’s NATO accession. It stood equally firmly against international blackmail to adopt the Annan Plan, providing historic security protection to Greek Cypriots to freely decide their future. We simultaneously corrected the Helsinki agreement’s weakness, which called on Turkey to “drag” us to The Hague for whatever issue it chose (“for all border disputes and related issues,” even including “grey zones” and island militarization). Because that’s exactly what Helsinki provided, which – hopefully from ignorance – still finds supporters today. Despite all this, the climate with our neighbor was positive and productive. Instead of being trapped in a narrowly Greek-Turkish dialogue as today, we imposed conditions on Turkey through our EU participation on all national issues. I recommend everyone study the “EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework” of 2005.
A crucial initiative of the then New Democracy government was “breaking” decades-old taboos by inaugurating intensive and difficult EEZ delimitation talks with neighboring states. Upon leaving in 2009, it left an excellent signed EEZ agreement with Albania, as well as another essentially ready one with Libya (both sides’ maps differed minimally and I hope this achievement will be utilized in new talks).
I also recall proposing the European Coast Guard establishment that was later implemented and resulted in Frontex patrols on the Turkish border, thus confirming our borders’ European character. Finally, we supported the return of former residents to threatened Eastern Aegean islets and, yes, we didn’t prefer replacing them with seabirds…
